RECOMMENDATION 7 OF THE ABA
COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT: THE
CLASSIC LAWYER v. CLIENT
CONFRONTATION
Herb Jaffe*
In these times, the two most compelling issues for the organized bar of New Jersey confront lawyers against the general lay
public. One, concerning the classic confrontation of lawyer v. client in ethically related matters, gives rise to the other, the bar's
consistent anguish over its public image. From my observation
point, the case of lawyer v. client-emanating from charges of
unethical behavior or steady habits of flagrant unprofessionalism-must be resolved before the bar of New Jersey can hope to
repress the impasse of a generally disconcerting image.
This essay is limited to concerns of lawyer ethics and professionalism and how they relate to client expectations and misapprehensions. It deals with a single issue: the extent of
confidentiality surrounding the New Jersey procedure that determines whether a lawyer has violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct or has otherwise acted irresponsibly or improperly.
Moreover, it begs the question of whether a certain code of ethics
should be given greater consideration and thereby credibility as a
reason for public complaint.
In numerous letters to my office, clients constantly complain
about their lawyer's discourtesy, intemperance and impatience.
Their most irritating concerns are the inability to obtain straight
answers to pressing questions and, most commonly, unreturned
phone calls. Obviously, some questions defy the kind of straight
answers a client may be seeking. A polite response, however,
could often serve as a satisfactory alternative. Yet, complaints
that focus on these and similar problems are most often the first
to be disregarded by a district ethics committee, simply because
they do not violate ethical standards.
Still, these were among the most fundamental questions
raised by the American Bar Association's Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (Trombadore Commission).
* Legal Affairs Editor and columnist, The Star Ledger, Newark, N.J.
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This is the panel that issued a comprehensive report in May,
1991 (Trombadore Report)' which recommended twenty-two
model reforms of the system that disciplines wayward attorneys.
The Trombadore Report generated considerable consternation
among all segments of the bar, but by far the most volatile issue
was Recommendation No. 7, which stated:
All records of the lawyer disciplinary agency except the work
product of disciplinary counsel should be available to the public from the time of the complainant's initial communication
with the agency, unless the complainant or respondent, upon a
showing of grounds that would be sufficient in a civil proceeding, obtains a protective order for specific documents or
records. All proceedings except adjudicative deliberations
should be public.2
What followed the release of the Trombadore Report, endorsed unanimously by the Trombadore Commission's seven members, has escalated into the most argumentative subject confronting
the nation's bar, as evidenced by the amount of discussion, debate
and lobbying during the ABA's midwinter convention in February.
In New Jersey, the issue has generated considerable stridence within
the bar, partly because the ABA commission chairman was Raymond Trombadore, a Somerville, N.J. attorney who is a past president of the New Jersey State Bar Association. 3 Trombadore spent
countless hours during the early 1980's in his role as chairman of
the state bar association committee that ultimately helped New
Jersey become the first state to adopt the Rules of Professional Conduct that presently guide the ethical behavior of attorneys.
The hostility generated by the Trombadore Report was flamed
by the fact that Recommendation No. 7 is diametrically opposed to
the public disclosure procedure that has always existed, and continues to prevail, in New Jersey. Not only did this issue arouse the ire
of New Jersey's lawyers to the extent that it became the focal point
of heated discussions within the state bar association and the
twenty-one county bar associations, but it opened the door to full
media exposure and, thereby, to public attention and scrutiny. In
many instances it invited public participation in the debate. That
was prompted in September, 1991 when the New Jersey Supreme
I ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, 1991 Report [hereinafter 1991 Report].
2 Id. at 23.
3 Trombadore was appointed to the commission when it was founded in February, 1989. He ascended to the chairmanship in June, 1990, upon the death of its
original chairman, former New York University Law School Dean Robert McKay.
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Court appointed its own ethics commission with responsibility for
conducting public hearings on the issue, researching the prevailing
system as a preface to any recommendations for reform, and reporting back to the court before the end of 1992.
Immediately after public release of the Trombadore Report, the
New Jersey Supreme Court announced it would create its own commission (Supreme Court Commission) to review the matter. Soon
afterward, Matthias D. Dileo, president of the state bar association,
announced that he would refer the report to his association's Special
Committee on Professional Responsibility for study and recommendation. 4 Francis X. Crahay, a retired appellate division judge,
chaired this committee (Crahay Committee). But just about the
time the Supreme Court Commission was appointed by Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz5 in September, 1991, and two months before
the Supreme Court Commission conducted its first public hearing,
the Crahay Committee released its "Report and Recommendations
of the New Jersey State Bar Association Regarding the Report of the
ABA Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement"
(Crahay Report). 6 The introduction in the Crahay Report noted
that the findings of the Crahay Committee had already been reviewed by the state bar association's board of trustees. It commented: "Because of the nature of New Jersey's disciplinary
structure, we see no need to 'open' the disciplinary process or to
take costly steps which further centralize the review and prosecution
of ethics complaints." 7
The Crahay Report made it abundantly clear that the New
Jersey State Bar Association would accept no compromise of disclosure in the disciplinary process, much less a recommendation to remove all confidentiality from the system. According to the Crahay
Report: "[T]he [Trombadore] [C]ommission says that it is 'convinced that the secrecy in disciplinary proceedings continues to be
the greatest single source of public distrust of lawyer disciplinary
systems.' There is no meaningful supporting data to support the
asserted 'conviction.' "' The Crahay Report cited an ABA report
prepared by a commission chaired by the onetime Associate Justice
4 Herb Jaffe, New Law ChiefAims at BrighterLawyer Image, THE STAR-LEDGER,June
9, 1991, A25, col. 1.
5 Id.

6 Report & Recommendations of the New Jersey State Bar Association Regarding the Report of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter Crahay Report].
7 Id. at 1.
8 Id.at 7.
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of the Supreme Court of the United States, Tom C. Clark (Clark
Report). 9 The Clark Report, released in 1970, castigated the bar for
the epidemic of unethical actions that were commonplace in all
states. It offered recommendations that led to major reforms of the
disciplinary procedures throughout the country. It retained, however, the belief that full confidentiality was required." °
In 1979, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a model procedure that removed confidentiality once there was evidence of probable cause that the complaint had merit." That would occur after a
preliminary investigation and hearing produced sufficient reason to
carry the complaint further. That reasoning is now employed in
thirty states. Three others-Oregon, Florida and West Virginiahave implemented forms of full disclosure, similar to the positions
in Recommendation No. 7.12 NewJersey remains among the minority of states that anxiously holds to the dark ages. Under Rule 1:2010, Discipline of Members of the Bar, on confidentiality:"3
(a) Generally. All proceedings conducted and records
made pursuant to R. 1:20 shall be confidential and shall not be
disclosed to or attended by anyone except as authorized by
these rules or as provided by the Supreme Court and as
follows:
(1) On the scheduling of oral argument for final discipline by the Supreme Court, in which event the recommendation of the board that is the subject thereof, together with any
briefs filed pursuant to an order of the Court, shall be made
public; or
(2) At the request of or with the consent of the respondent and upon the ultimate determination of any disciplinary
proceeding; or
(3) On the entry of final orders of the Supreme Court in
respect of disciplinary matters; or
14
(4) Upon the order of the Supreme Court.
The Crahay Report, and its approval by the state bar association's board of trustees, did not recognize that the ABA policy vote
by the House of Delegates in 1979 superseded the antiquated posi9 A.B.A. Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, 1970
Report [hereinafter Clark Report].
10 Id. at 138-42.
11 A.B.A. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Rule 16 cmt. (1979).
12 For a full discussion of the Oregon, Florida and West Virginia approaches,
see 1991 Report, supra note 1, at 23-26.
'3 N.J. CT. RULE 1:20-10 (1991).
14

Id.
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tion New Jersey took following the revelations of the Clark Commission in 1970. The state bar said: "The Clark Commission [R]eport
fully explored this issue [non-disclosure of accusations] and came
down squarely on the side of maintaining the confidentiality of disciplinary records.... The [NewJersey State Bar Association] believes
that the reasoning of the Clark Commission [R]eport remains sound
and viable to this date and that nothing in the [Trombadore Report]
persuades to the contrary." 15
The diametrically opposite viewpoints of Crahay and
Trombadore were exchanged during a public dialogue at the New
Jersey Law Center, at which time the views of the state bar association were made public. 6 Crahay defended the association's position, a defense that subsequently was challenged by scores of
individuals in testimony before the Supreme Court Ethics Commission1 7 and in a letter-writing campaign to The Star-Ledger from
persons throughout the state. According to Crahay:
The system is a good one. We have [lay people] on every level
[of our discipline system]. I have worked in those committees,
representing attorneys. I have served with lay people ... on a

Supreme Court committee which had disciplinary functions. I
have never once heard anyone suggest that there was cronyism, or the good-boy or good-girl buddy system. Not once.
There is no need for this extreme proposal....
But you ask the man on the street.. . "What's wrong with
the legal profession?" They usually tell you two things: "They
charge too much and they don't return phone calls." I've
asked around and I have not had one person say to me, "the
confidentiality of your disciplinary system is disturbing."
There is just8not a public need, and the harm that comes is far,
far greater.'
Trombadore disagreed with Crahay's position and stated:
Can we as a profession responsible to a public continue to
maintain a system of lawyer discipline and expect the public to
trust that system, to respect the integrity of that system, when
we are not prepared to let the public see how that system operates and understand its integrity and its fairness? To me,
that's the issue.
15
16

Crahay Report, supra note 6, at 8-9.
Media/Bench/Bar Dialogue, Public Access to Complaints Against Lawyers, New

Jersey Law Center [hereinafter Dialogue] (Oct. 24, 1991).
17

The New Jersey Supreme Court Ethics Commission conducted public hear-

ings on Recommendation No. 7 on November 21, 1991, December 11, 199 1,January 15, 1992, and February 6, 1992.
18 Dialogue, supra note 16, at 19.
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Until 1970, practically every disciplinary system in the United
States was a secret system. Totally confidential. Only the results were made public and then in ninety percent of the cases
you didn't know what happened, because you didn't get any
results, because ninety percent of the cases were, and still are,
dismissed and are never made public. Of over 100,000 complaints filed in the United States in 1989, over 85,000 were
dismissed and never made public.
So we've have had this tremendous history of confidentiality and secrecy in lawyer regulation, in the way we regulate
the conduct of lawyers. That has come under a great deal of
scrutiny. The report of the New Jersey State Bar Association
[Crahay Report] says people in New Jersey like the way we operate; they're happy with the way we operate. I've read in at
least one publication here in New Jersey that the only people
who seem to think people in New Jersey are dissatisfied are
Ray Trombadore and the members of his ABA commission.
That commission spent two and a half years studying lawyer discipline in this country, and I have spent thirty years operating in lawyer discipline in this state. We concluded that in
spite of tremendous progress made since 1970, lawyer disciplinary systems by and large are not trusted by the public, not
respected. [Attorney discipline systems are] [s]till treated as
being infected with inherent conflict because they are self-regulating. [Attorney discipline systems are] [s]till grossly disrespected because they operate so slowly and so secretly and are
so soft on lawyers, when you're all done.' 9
As an after-thought, Trombadore added: "[T]hree years after I
[complained about a lawyer] to the secretary of a committee, I was
told that a private reprimand was issued. I can't even talk about it,
it's still secret. And it took three years to get a slap on the wrist for
that lawyer. '"20

Under a private reprimand, the lawyer receives a written, nonpublic discipline for what is generally believed to be a minor ethical
infraction. 2 ' Because it is private, however, no one knows for certain what happens to the lawyer and what he or she did to warrant
the reprimand. During one of the public hearings conducted by the
New Jersey Supreme Court Ethics Commission, the following collo19 Id. at 15.
20

Id.

State of the Attorney Disciplinary System Report (1990) (prepared by the Office of
Attorney Ethics, New Jersey Supreme Court).
21
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22
quy unfolded:
Morristown attorney Thomas Chesson, secretary of the District
Ethics Committee for Morris and Sussex counties, stated: "If you
open up the process, you are using up the method of private repri23
mands. You're losing that as a form of attorney punishment.
United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Robert E.
Cowen, however, countered: "Why should there be such an animal
as a private reprimand?" 24 Cowen, a member of the Supreme Court
Ethics Commission, went on to say to Chesson, who appeared
before the commission as a witness: "If even the complainant
doesn't know there has been a private reprimand, does that make

sense to you?"

25

The entire posture of confidentiality waves a red flag, in almost
every dimension of a free society, especially to the media whose very
premise is the freedom afforded under the First Amendment. Client
witnesses appearing before the Supreme Court Commission have
expressed their objections to being exposed to contempt if they
dare publicly discuss their complaint of lawyer misbehavior. One
argument commonly raised is that ethics committees often do not
notify complainants of the findings, especially if the lawyer is privately reprimanded.
In March, 1990, a United States District Court in Florida overturned the state's rule that prohibited anyone who filed charges of
unethical behavior against lawyers from speaking freely about their
complaints. The court declared the rule unconstitutional. 26 The
Florida case involved a private reprimand of a lawyer. The bar had
advised the complainant that even though the charge he filed was
truthful, it was "confidential and that any violation of confidentiality
would be punished by contempt." '2 7 The plaintiff argued that the
confidentiality rule violated the free speech clause of the First
Amendment. 28 The court, noting that the rule served to inhibit
complaints, commented: "Why a complainant would be more inclined to file a grievance against his lawyer, with the knowledge that
he is thereby forever barred form speaking publicly about the griev22 Hearings of the New Jersey Supreme Court Ethics Commission, Elizabeth,
N.J. (Jan. 15, 1992).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida, 734 F. Supp. 981 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
27 Id. at 982.
28 Id. at 984.
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ance, is unclear."
The court concluded: "The idea that the suppression of truthful criticism of lawyers would somehow enhance or protect the reputation of the bar is not persuasive. To the contrary, continuing the
prohibitory effect of the rule after a grievance against an attorney is
found to be meritorious is far more likely to engender suspicion
than foster confidence."" ° It added that the rule "is not narrowly
tailored to meet the specific interest it is said to serve. Rather, it
broadly stifles speech when the ends it purports to achieve can be
met by more narrow means. So broad an encroachment upon First
Amendment freedoms cannot stand."'' 3 Instead of appealing the
decision, the defendants-the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida State Bar Association-amended the disciplinary rules to con32
form to the decision.
On February 4, the ABA House of Delegates soundly defeated
Recommendation No. 7, although it approved twenty of the twentytwo recommendations in the Trombadore Report. One other provision was voluntarily removed. The result of the defeat of Recommendation No. 7 reverted ABA policy to the position the House of
Delegates adopted in 1979: no disclosure of a complaint until the
ethics committee to which the complaint has been filed can determine whether there is probable cause.
In the meantime, the state bar association had prepared a statement to be read on the house floor by one of its delegates, Michael
Prigoff. The overwhelming defeat of Recommendation No. 7 made
it unnecessary to present the statement, which would have encouraged a return to the 1970 position and full confidentiality.
"Nothing we have seen in the report of the Trombadore
[C]ommission suggests that the conclusions of the Clark
[C]ommission in 1970 relative to this issue have changed," the
statement said.3 3
The Supreme Court Ethics Commission, however, has not been
influenced by either the outcome of the House of Delegates vote or
the reactionary position of the state bar association. It will either
stay with the existing system, recommend the 1979 ABA position of
disclosure upon probable cause, or suggest full disclosure similar to
Recommendation No. 7.
29
30

Id. at 985.
Id. at 988.

3l

Id.

See 35 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-7.1(d) (West 1992).
Remarks in Opposition to Recommendation No. 7 (1992) (unpublished manuscript) (prepared by N.J. State Bar Association delegates to ABA).
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